000			04792cam a2200433 i 4500
001			2014012098
003			DLC
005			20190729110211.0
008			140522s2015 nyu b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2014012098
020			_a9780199392001 (hardback)
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cDLC _dMvI
042			_apcc
050	0	0	_aHB3717 1929 _b.E37 2015
082	0	0	_a330.9/043 _223
084			_aBUS023000 _aBUS069010 _aBUS069000 _2bisacsh
100	1		_aEichengreen, Barry J.
245	1	0	_aHall of mirrors : _bthe Great Depression, the great recession, and the uses-and misuses-of history / _cBarry Eichengreen.
264		1	_aNew York, NY : _bOxford University Press, _c[2015]
300			_avi, 512 pages ; _c25 cm
336			_atext _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 417-493) and index.
520			_a"There have been two global financial crises in the past century: the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession that began in 2008. Both featured loose credit, precarious real estate and stock market bubbles, suspicious banking practices, an inflexible monetary system, and global imbalances; both had devastating economic consequences. In both cases, people in the prosperous decade preceding the crash believed they were living in a post-volatility economy, one that had tamed the cycle of boom and bust. When the global financial system began to totter in 2008, policymakers were able to draw on the lessons of the Great Depression in order to prevent a repeat, but their response was still inadequate to prevent massive economic turmoil on a global scale. In Hall of Mirrors, renowned economist Barry Eichengreen provides the first book-length analysis of the two crises and their aftermaths. Weaving together the narratives of the 30s and recent years, he shows how fear of another Depression greatly informed the policy response after the Lehman Brothers collapse, with both positive and negative results. On the positive side, institutions took the opposite paths that they had during the Depression; government increased spending and cut taxes, and central banks reduced interest rates, flooded the market with liquidity, and coordinated international cooperation. This in large part prevented the bank failures, 25% unemployment rate, and other disasters that characterized the Great Depression. But they all too often hewed too closely and too literally to the lessons of the Depression, seeing it as a mirror rather than focusing on the core differences. Moreover, in their haste to differentiate themselves from their forbears, today's policymakers neglected the constructive but ultimately futile steps that the Federal Reserve took in the 1930s. While the rapidly constructed policies of late 2008 did succeed in staving off catastrophe in the years after, policymakers, institutions, and society as a whole were too eager to get back to normal, even when that meant stunting the recovery via harsh austerity policies and eschewing necessary long-term reforms. The result was a grindingly slow recovery in the US and a devastating recession in Europe. Hall of Mirrors is not only a monumental work of economic history, but an essential exploration of how we avoided making only some of the same mistakes twice--and why our partial remedy makes us highly susceptible to making other, equally important mistakes yet again"-- _cProvided by publisher.
520			_a"A brilliantly conceived dual-track account of the two greatest economic crises of the last century and their consequences"-- _cProvided by publisher.
505	8		_aMachine generated contents note: -- Introduction -- Castles in Spain Made Real -- Inflation's Shadow -- Children's Playroom -- Financialization with a Vengeance -- Flip That House -- Europe and the Euro -- The Crisis to End All Crises -- The J.P. Morgan of the South -- Shuttle Diplomacy -- Will America Topple Too? -- Largely Contained -- Out of the Shadows -- The Worst Financial Crisis Since 1933 -- The Three B's -- New Deal -- Double Dip -- Preventing the Worst -- Unconventional Policy -- Weak Soup -- The Turn to Austerity -- The Euro Crisis -- Whatever It Takes -- Conclusion.
650		0	_aDepressions _y1929.
650		0	_aEconomic policy _xHistory _y20th century.
650		0	_aGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009.
650		0	_aEconomic policy _xHistory _y21st century.
650		7	_aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economic History. _2bisacsh
650		7	_aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Comparative. _2bisacsh
650		7	_aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General. _2bisacsh
948			_au603400
949			_aHB3717 1929 .E37 2015 _wLC _c1 _hEY8Z _i33039001357861
596			_a1
903			_a31811
999			_c31811 _d31811